"The primary reason for this persistent crisis is the failure to implement the many agreements that have been reached at various levels and at different times on the past years" Pres Paul Kagame at EAC leaders' summit in Nov 2022.

At the time of writing this, the East African Community-appointed facilitator for the DRC peace process, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, is involved in an intensive shuttle diplomacy to try and bring the government and rebels to the table to talk lasting peace. That Mr. Kenyatta enjoys good rapport with presidents Felix Tshisekedi of DRC as well as Rwanda’s Paul Kagame is undisputed, making him perhaps the best placed person to mediate this conflict at this time.

So far, there has been mixed results but it is widely believed to be making steady progress at the very least towards more structured talks that could potentially lead to a peace deal. The regional peace enforcement force has started deploying since the signing of the agreement back in April 2022 in which four EAC countries were mandated to send boots on the ground i.e. Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. As of December 1^st, already Burundi and Kenya have sent troops under the East African Regional Force flag.

But as the talks enter this crucial stage, it is critical for the facilitator and his team to take the following into account:

1. Holding any dialogue or peace talks without the largest rebel movement, the M23, simply because Kinshasa doesn’t want to “deal with terrorists” is wrong. The assumption here is that all the facilitators need is Rwanda’s support and M23 problem will go away. Assuming M23 only and exclusively operates at the behest of Rwanda is a blatant disregard of genuine grievances that they have against Kinshasa’s misrule in the eastern DRC region. Uhuru's table must be big enough to accommodate every relevant actor.

2. There appears to be two parallel processes for peace in DRC: Nairobi Process by Uhuru Kenyatta of EAC and Luanda Process led by Angola’s Joao Lourenco. The AU Peace & Security Council should consider merging these two processes to avoid duplication and better focus the continental body’s resources.

3. Learn from shortcomings of previous peace process. One of the key component of the 2003 Global Inclusive Agreement which ended the Second Congo War was comprehensive security sector reforms that were meant to integrate all armed groups into the national army FARDC. This integration was not effectively implemented and some groups mutinied from FARDC, the most prominent of these being CNDP which later on morphed into present day M23. The DRC is rife with armed groups estimated to number 120. It is also important to note that due to failure in implementing the SSR, even the national army in Eastern DRC is largely made up of a loose collation of armed groups that occasionally support Kinshasa  when their interests align but are primarily ethnic militia that carry out atrocities against rival groups with civilians bearing the greatest brunt.

Let me be clear, without effective Security Sector Reforms and a well-resourced DDR component, we will be back to square one even if we force the parties to sign a peace deal.

Finally, as MONUSCO’s term ends and the AU works on establishing a successor peacekeeping mission in DRC, it will have to deal with the twin problem of funding and which African countries should contribute the green helmets.

DRC conflict is notoriously intractable and has a long history of sucking in numerous economic and security interests, both state and non state. It is important for facilitators to have a measured sense of optimism, define what can be achieved at this moment and focus all attention and resources on that while also laying the groundwork for near term and future processes. Rushing to sign a deal while leaving out many parties, sweeping under the carpet genuine grievances of the Congolese people and underestimating the daunting task of implementation will lead us to the same position in a couple of months.