South Sudan’s Pres Salva Kiir has asked his Kenyan counterpart William Ruto to mediate between government and hold-out groups (South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance or SSOMA). This comes after reaching a deadlock during the Rome Initiative spearheaded by the Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio.

Quick facts:

1. Who is SSOMA? These are opposition groups that walked out of the Addis Ababa talks that birthed the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCISS) in 2018. It’s made of 9 groups with the 3 main ones being: National salvation Front (NAS) led by Thomas Cirillo, South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A) of Paul Malong and Real SPLM of Pagan Amum.

2. What has been achieved in the deadlocked Rome Initiative? There is a Declaration of Principles signed by both sides on 10th March 2021, reaffirming another DoP dated 12th Jan 2020. Key issues where common ground was found are:

  1. Reaffirming cessation of hostilities
  2. Fair and transparent sharing of national resources and wealth
  3. Establishment of transitional justice mechanisms as the only basis for reconciliation and healing
  4. Land: that it belongs to the people and any dispute related to it shall be resolved according to the tribal and communal boundaries as they stood on 01/01/1956. That this shall be incorporated in the new constitution.
  5. National Security be reformed and denied the power of domestic law enforcement (no arrest, prosecutorial and detention)

3. Why the deadlock? Not much has been going on since the signing of the DoP in March 2021 whose aftermath has been typical of peace pacts in South Sudan: precarious with multiple violations of CoH and little to no tangible progress. It is instructive to note that the mediators of the Rome Initiative have not officially communicated that they encountered a deadlock. Indeed, some SSOMA members averred as much, wondering on what basis Kiir invited Ruto to lead the talks. There was also disagreement as to who would monitor the implementation of a potential peace deal between the two, with some in SSOMA uncomfortable with the current IGAD-led CTSAMVM that is monitoring implementation of R-ARCISS.

The government has shown keenness to restart the talks probably due to a number of factors:

  1. By casting himself as the man of peace holding out the olive branch, Kiir might be desperate to piece together some kind of national unity in the hope of lending some badly needed legitimacy to what is promising to be a very messy 2024 election, if at all there will be one. Elections or no elections, Kiir is more than likely to happily remain right where he is. However it goes, he’d much rather this is seen as ‘popular will’, not as the product of his Machiavellian designs.
  2. Government camp is aware that their current partners in RTGoNU led by Riek Machar’s SPLM-IO are splintered and woefully weakened. It would be in Kiir’s advantage to sign a deal with SSOMA that is just enough to be seen like he's pursuing genuine peace while making Riek & Co thoroughly dependent on his good graces. Kiir is a master at this chess game.
  3. It is likely that the government wasn’t too comfortable with how discussions were proceeding based on some previously agreed aspects i.e. parts of DoPs. Some of these hot potato issues include the discussions around land and proposal to go back to 1956 communal boundaries and also demand for implementation of transitional justice provisions in Chapter V of R-ARCISS.

Is Kenya the best mediator? Not really, but sisi ndio tuko. Our record on regional peace efforts have been largely good only on paper. Case in point: Kenya has been a guarantor on the CPA and consequent deals in South Sudan and they are all limping. Kenya does have a great opportunity to shore up its credentials after a mediocre result in DRC, plus its about time we got real success in South Sudan post CPA.

What about the current deal, the R-ARCISS? It is likely that the government will use this as the reason to limit talks on ‘uncomfortable’ issues that will be raised by SSOMA. This will be ironical because it’s not like they’re perfectly implementing R-ARCISS! STILL, it is imperative for the talks to seek to harmonize the spirit of R-ARCISS and letter of this new initiative. From the 2021 Declaration of Principles, it is very clear that critical issues that are not adequately addressed in R-ARCISS have been brought to the fore e.g. land, NSS act and constitutional review. It is also important to build on the achievements of the R-ARCISS as well as the Rome Initiative successes.

How can Kenya prepare and work towards a better and more sustainable outcome?

1. First, Pres Ruto needs to be personally engaged. Period.  He must be willing to think out of the box while being very aware of what can be practically achieved. Ruto must not heavily rely on the usual gatekeepers and old guard of peace agreements. Some of them have sat at the table for too long purely to pursue interests on their behalf or powerful parties, which has led to rigid processes with the same outcomes.

2. Security guarantees for the opposition. It is no secret that Kenya hasn’t been very kind to South Sudanese political dissidents. Multiple cases of political activists being kidnapped in broad daylight in Kenya and being shipped over to Juba where they have been detained or killed are known to all. Our security forces have rogue officers who collude with foreign agents to carry out extrajudicial activities. These agents have found safe havens in Nairobi and Kakuma Refugee Camp. No wonder Thomas Cirillo’s NAS has recently voiced these same concerns. Kenya’s president MUST give security guarantees for participants. While at it, he urgently needs to weed out rogue security agents who have acted extrajudicially on behalf of Juba. (One day I’ll write about the rot in Kakuma Refugee camp)

3. Identify upfront what NEEDS to be achieved and how to achieve it. Do not allow open-ended discussions; South Sudan conflict is very complex and deep rooted and these people can talk until the cows come home but nothing tangible will come out of it. In fact, the problem is not coming up with a peace deal; the devil is ALWAYS in the implementation. So, the mediator needs to define what is the barest minimum for the South Sudanese people and what is the time-bound implementation matrix. What leverage can be used to ensure strict implementation? It must not be another elite bargaining exercise. The 2021 Declaration of Principles has boldly outlined some very sticky issues that were glossed over in the Addis process that birthed the R-ARCISS.

What to keep an eye on