The ongoing war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has already devastated Sudan. Now, there is a real and growing possibility that this conflict could spill over into South Sudan, escalating into a full-fledged proxy war.
The Shadow of Proxy Conflict
Historically, Sudan’s internal wars have rarely remained confined within its borders. A resurgent and newly resourced SAF, seeking to push RSF back into Darfur and toward Chad, may reactivate long-dormant militias in South Sudan. These militias, once Sudanese clients, could find themselves repurposed in a regional conflict that neither Sudan nor South Sudan can afford.
A significant sign of this growing geopolitical entanglement was the RSF’s recent launch of a parallel government in Nairobi, a move that prominently featured the leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). This faction is closely linked to President Salva Kiir’s ruling SPLM-In-Government (SPLM-IG) in Juba, creating deep suspicion within Burhan’s SAF-led military establishment.
South Sudan’s Fragile Security Landscape
Burhan and the SAF leadership believe that RSF has allies in Juba and suspect that South Sudan has served as a transit corridor for weapons shipments to RSF forces. This perception has raised tensions to new heights. When one of Burhan’s top generals recently threatened "retaliatory action against Chad and South Sudan," it was not mere rhetoric—it was a warning that South Sudan could become the next battleground.
For South Sudan, this is a grave threat. Its government, led by President Salva Kiir, faces internal divisions and a weak security apparatus. As of writing this, Pres Kiir is keeping his First Vice President under house arrest; a clear violation of the peace agreement governing the country. Chapter 2 of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was designed to implement security sector reforms (SSR), yet these crucial measures remain largely unfulfilled (IGAD, 2023). Without a unified and professional army, South Sudan is vulnerable to infiltration by foreign-backed militias.
Uganda’s Dilemma: A New Front for the UPDF?
Given South Sudan’s military weakness, Uganda may find itself drawn into the conflict. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), under General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, has historically intervened in South Sudan to support Kiir’s government. UPDF has recently deployed in South Sudan under a controversial Status of Forces bilateral signed back in 2014. It's mandate is vaguely to prop up Kiir's government and engage the White Army militia (a Nuer community militia) in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. UPDF has been bombarding white army positions in Nassir and Akobo towns. However, if SAF begins actively supporting disgruntled South Sudanese militias, Uganda may face a broader confrontation beyond the White Army .
The potential for a regional conflict involving Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, and possibly Chad is increasing by the day.
A Worsening Humanitarian Catastrophe
The humanitarian consequences of such a proxy war would be catastrophic. South Sudan is already dealing with an influx of over 500,000 refugees and returnees from Sudan’s war (UN-OCHA, 2024). The UN warns that over 9.4 million South Sudanese are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, while Sudan’s crisis has displaced more than 8 million people (UN-OCHA, 2024). The outbreak of a proxy war in South Sudan would further strain an already collapsing aid infrastructure.
Time for Strategic Conflict Management
For too long, peace efforts in both Sudan and South Sudan have been driven by elite political interests rather than genuine pursuit for peace and resolution. International mediators have disregarded expert analysis and failed to address the root causes of instability. There has been zero accountability and justice which has further emboldened the same perpetrators to continue the cycle of brutal violence. While a lasting peace remains the ultimate goal, the immediate challenge is conflict management—mitigating the worst consequences of the war while reducing opportunities for external meddling.
The region cannot afford another full-scale war. Without urgent diplomatic interventions and genuine security sector reforms, South Sudan risks becoming the next front in an expanding regional conflict.
Conclusion
The growing prospect of a Sudanese proxy war in South Sudan is no longer theoretical—it is a developing reality. If the international community fails to act decisively, the Greater Horn of Africa may once again become a theater of unending conflict. The world cannot afford to ignore the warning signs.
Citations:
- IGAD. (2023). Status of the Implementation of R-ARCSS in South Sudan. Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
- UN-OCHA. (2024). Sudan and South Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis Update. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- International Crisis Group. (2023). Sudan’s War and Its Spillover Risks in the Region.